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data, and formalization vs. non-formalization may suggest a
way to bridge the idealism of the individual-based tripartite
method with that of the more common one-or two-method
scholarship. If researchers were to choose a method from each
column and from each row, it would force most people out of
their comfort zone. To fulfill this requirement, researchers would
have to include one formal component (either formal theory or
quantitative analysis) and one non-formal component (either
theory or narrative); similarly they would have to include one
data component (either narrative or quantitative analysis) and
one theoretical component (either formal or non-formal
theory). This type of selection rule in choosing methodolo-
gies would introduce much greater flexibility than Latin’s tri-
partite suggestion, by allowing for fewer methods in any one
project and including non-formal theory as a choice. But, it
would follow the spirit of Laitin’s framework and his own work,
by encouraging all researchers to bridge the mathematical
and empirical divides. I hasten to add, however, that even this
two-by-two framework and methodological selection scheme
has to be seen as an ideal type predicated on the assumption
of adequate resources, including data, theory, and skills of re-
searchers. The most difficult and important problems that
political science faces–e.g. democracy, development, and rep-
resentation in inhospitable circumstances–may be areas where
several types of resources are lacking, and therefore at the
end of the day researchers have to make methodological
choices given the demands and constraints of problems of
interest.
Notes
1 To be fair, his primary goal in the 2003 article is set up the
tripartite method as a framework for social science and to place
narrative within framework on equal footing with quantitative and
formal modeling, and in the article Laitin spends a great deal of time
discussing the value of narrative methods.  So, it is possible that the
vagueness is the unintentional result of a focus on other issues.
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In his book Hegemony and Culture, David Laitin described
himself as being committed to “a comparative politics that is
sensitive to the particularities of each society, yet asks broad
and general questions about all societies” (1986: xii). This idea
of comparative politics–that it is in part a discipline that en-
gages in the study of individual countries mainly for the pur-
pose of producing cross-country generalizations–is the way
in which most of us define the field now. And Laitin’s work,
which includes a study of the particularities of Somalia, Nige-
ria, India, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in
order to produce knowledge about other countries and conti-
nents, is unprecedented in comparative politics in its ambition
and accomplishments in combining depth and breadth.
But what kind of breadth should we expect depth to gen-
erate? What kinds of generalizations based on within-country
studies should we value in comparative politics?
In principle, we value generalizations about outcomes. So,
when Lijphart finds that consociationalism preserves demo-
cratic stability in the Netherlands (Lijphart 1975, 1977), we want
to know if consociationalism is also associated with demo-
cratic stability in other countries–South Africa or the former
Yugoslavia. When Putnam finds that social capital explains
institutional performance in Italy (Putnam 1993), we want to
know if it also explains the same outcome elsewhere–Russia,
or the U.S.. And when Laitin finds that the hegemony intro-
duced by colonial rule explains the non-politicization of reli-
gion in Yorubaland (Laitin 1986), we want to know whether
colonial hegemony explain the non-politicization of cleavages
in other places–Zambia or India. Indeed, the ability to generate
correct predictions about outcomes in out-of-sample coun-
tries is often treated as a test for the validity of a theory devel-
oped from a within-country study.
Against this backdrop, I make four arguments in this es-
say, illustrated with reference to Laitin’s work:
(1) Although I share the view that the value of within-
country studies in comparative politics lies in generating knowl-
edge about other countries, I think that we are wrong in trying
to distill generalizations about outcomes from within–country
studies. The generalizations we should look for are generaliza-
tions about the mechanisms linking the independent and the
dependent variable.
(2) We should evaluate the quality of such generaliza-
tions, not by testing to see if the entire chain of mechanisms
linking the cause and the outcome in one country is the same
in others, but by seeing how far the chain of mechanisms in a
new country coincides with that of the first before it diverges.
(3) Arguing about whether we should use ethnography or
rational choice or both in our work is beside the point. “Eth-
nography” and “rational choice” are not strictly comparable–
the one is an approach to how data are collected, the other an
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approach that tells us what to look for in the data. A forced
comparison between the two suggests they are simply two
overlapping ways of identifying mechanisms, among many
other ways. They are not mutually exclusive–both can be used
to identify mechanisms. Neither are they exhaustive. A scholar
could use neither and still produce illuminating research. We
should be arguing about what kind of knowledge to aim for,
rather than privileging one or two approaches among a multi-
tude of possibilities for generating that knowledge.
(4) The ambition of a mechanism-oriented approach is dif-
ferent from that of an outcome-oriented approach–and should
produce different work. An outcome-oriented approach aims
to use within-country studies to impose a uniform explanatory
framework–with the same independent variables explaining the
dependent variable–on as many countries as possible. The
ambition of a mechanism-oriented approach is different: it is to
use the study of one country to produce more sophisticated
questions about new countries and get us closer to a series of
unique point predictions about outcomes in other countries
without the expectation that these outcomes will be the same
in all countries.
Many of us in comparative politics would balk at this
advocacy of point predictions. We tend to believe that “sci-
ence” is about generalizing about outcomes across countries.
I do not argue here that we should not aim for such generali-
zations in comparative politics. Some approaches that are,
and should be, well accepted in comparative politics–such as
cross-country statistical work–do indeed identify general pat-
terns across countries that can be justified according to pre-
vailing social scientific standards. But when working with
within-country studies, there is a conflict between “science”
and this type of generalization. When transplanting knowl-
edge from within-country studies, it is scientifically more de-
fensible to aim for unique point predictions in additional coun-
tries.
I read the progression of Laitin’s work in the past twenty
years as an evolution from a concern with making generaliza-
tions about outcomes from within-country studies to a con-
cern with making generalizations about mechanisms–and in
particular, mechanisms about strategic action. Correspond-
ingly, his work has also implicitly moved away from a concern
with making predictions about outcomes intended to apply to
a broad universe of cases to a concern with making a series of
point predictions about individual countries. In the process,
it has become more scientific.
I. Outcomes and Mechanisms
Outcomes and mechanisms have been distinguished in
several ways. One way of making a distinction is to say that
outcome-oriented analyses are about correlations (or laws),
while mechanism-oriented analyses are about causal paths
(Elster 1989, 3-10). But what is a causal path if not a series of
correlations? Another is to say that the difference between
outcome and mechanism is the difference between structure
and process. But that just shifts the question–what is struc-
ture and what is process? A third is to say that outcomes are
“tangible, observable things,” while mechanisms are unob-
servable mental processes. But what seems to be a “tangible,
observable thing”  is often a realization of unobservable idea–
“democracy,” for instance, which we routinely think of as an
outcome, is an intangible idea for which we have developed
measures and indicators. And what seems to be an unobserv-
able mental process is often something that can be observed
and measured–for instance, we could measure “beliefs” by
developing indicators based on survey data or experimental
data that test for actions consistent with some beliefs and not
others.
I take the difference between an outcome-based analysis
and a mechanism-based analysis to be a difference in the de-
gree of the fineness of the analysis rather than a difference in
what is being explained. An outcome-based analysis makes a
statement about a “macro-correlation” between two variables:
12
Mechanism-based analyses are statements about the se-
ries of “micro-correlations” that constitute the logical chain
linking the macro-correlation:
11.11.21.31.41.5………………….2
I use a number series to illustrate the difference between
the two because it illustrates nicely that there is no limit to the
fineness of analysis that can be used in a mechanism-based
approach. Just as there is an infinity of points between two
numbers on a continuous scale, there is an infinity of micro-
correlations that constitute the larger correlation.
But there is no difference in the essential nature of the
dependent variable that either an outcome-oriented or a mecha-
nism-oriented approach attempts to explain. The difference
lies only in the distance of the explanatory variable from the
dependent variable. In an outcome-based approach, the inde-
pendent variable is distant from the dependent variable. The
correlation between the two, therefore, is not obvious. In a
mechanism-based approach, each micro-correlation links two
proximate points. Thus, each micro-correlation may well be
obvious. But a sequence of micro-correlations taken together
travels a great distance from the initial variable that triggered
them, and produces a non-obvious outcome.
II. Why We Should Not Expect Within-Country Studies to
Produce Generalizations about Outcomes Across Countries
Within-country studies in comparative politics now rou-
tinely present themselves as using controlled comparison to
identify hypotheses about outcomes that can be generalized
to outcomes in other countries–or are evaluated on the ability
to produce such generalizations. Laitin’s 1986 Hegemony and
Culture is an example. The outcome that Laitin wants to ex-
plain in this book is the non-politicization of religion in
Yorubaland in Nigeria. Although both tribe and religion are
socially salient cleavages in Yorubaland, tribe is politicized
and religion is not. The key independent variable explaining
this outcome is the ideological hegemony instituted by the
colonial state. British colonialism in Yorubaland adopted a sys-
tem of indirect rule which created a commonsensical world in
which tribe was “real” and  religion was not. Consequently,
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long after the departure of the British, the Yoruba organized
their politics on the basis of tribe rather than religion. Within
the context of Yorubaland, the simple bivariate correlation un-
earthed by the book is:
Colonial Hegemony
Post-colonial Politicization of a Cleavage
If we wanted to use this within-country study to explain
outcomes in another country what should we do? At first
glance, it appears that we should look for the same simple bi-
variate correlation between the cleavage institutionalized by
the colonial state and the cleavage that becomes politicized
among the public. Indeed, this is what Laitin does in his con-
cluding chapter, where he attempts to “test” the hypothesis
developed from Yorubaland in the case of Benin. The book
finds that the pattern of politicization in post-colonial politics
can be explained by the pattern of politicization adopted by
colonial rule. Consequently, Laitin argues that Benin “demon-
strates the power...of the model of hegemony” (p. 165).
But if we really wanted to test the theory of outcomes in
Yorubaland in other countries, the first step would be to note
that this theory is not bivariate at all. It can be taken as a
bivariate relationship only in the context of Yorubaland, when
all other variables are held constant by virtue of the selection
of the case. These control variables include any number of
things such as the economy, the ethnic demography, the du-
ration of colonial rule, climate, ecology, history, patterns of
past violence, political leadership, and institutional structure,
only some of which can be explicitly identified. These con-
trols make it possible to isolate the impact of colonial rule in
the case of Yorubaland. But when exporting the model to other
cases, the researcher must also export the controls within
which it is embedded, implicitly or explicitly. Thus, the test
should really read:
Colonial Hegemony + Economy + Ecology + Climate +
History + ………………  Post-colonial Politicization of
a Cleavage
Unless this entire model is exported, we do not know
whether it is corroborated or not. The fact that Benin corrobo-
rates the model is thus a false positive, since we do not know
whether the control variables, on which the effect of colonial
hegemony was contingent in Yorubaland, also took on the
same value in the case of Benin. And had Laitin reported a
case which disproved the bivariate correlation–i.e., showed
that the institutionalization of cleavages during colonial rule
was not associated with the post-colonial politicization of
cleavages–it would have been a false negative, since that simple
correlation is not in fact the true model.
Could Laitin have tested the “correct” model? Could any-
one, on the basis of a within-country study? I don’t think so.
To conduct the right test would mean that all the control vari-
ables embedded in the case selection would have to be made
explicit and entered into the “export” version of the model. But
this is not possible, because it is not clear what those control
variables are. There are an infinity of things that are controlled
for implicitly when a researcher chooses a controlled design
within a country. That is what makes a within-country design
attractive as a natural experiment. How might we put these
many things into a model? A researcher might assert that not
all of these controls are relevant–that only two of the possible
infinity of variables matter and thus only two need to be ex-
ported to a new country or countries. But the research design
does not permit that inference, since there is no variation in the
control variables on the basis of which the researcher could
have determined the relevance or irrelevance of these vari-
ables. And even if a model could be specified, we could not
estimate it, because it would be heavily overdetermined, with
more variables than cases.
I have used Hegemony and Culture as an example, but
many within-country studies in comparative politics fall into
the same mold. Like Hegemony and Culture, their titles adver-
tise simple bivariate correlations. Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Putnam 1993) advertises a
bivariate correlation between civic traditions and the perfor-
mance of democratic institutions; Ethnic Conflict and Civic
Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Varshney 2002) adver-
tises a bivariate correlation between civic life and ethnic con-
flict; Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Posner 2005)
advertises a bivariate correlation between institutions and
the politicization of cleavages; Votes and Violence: Electoral
Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Wilkinson 2004) ad-
vertises a correlation between electoral competition and eth-
nic riots; and my own work Why Ethnic Parties Succeed:
Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India (Chandra 2004)
advertises a bivariate correlation between patronage and the
politics of ethnic headcounting. The correlations are surely
con-textualized by the names of countries and regions–“in
Italy,” “in India,” “in Africa.” But the authors aim in these
within-country studies to produce hypotheses that explain
outcomes in other countries, and are evaluated on the basis
of this ambition.
For the reasons given above, this ambition is unlikely to
be realized, and this standard of evaluation unlikely to be met.
Indeed, while we can think of numerous examples of within-
country studies that identify interesting, internally consis-
tent, bivariate hypotheses, it is difficult to think of bivariate
hypotheses generated from within-country studies that have
actually been verified through cross-national research.
III. Why Theories of Outcomes Within Countries Should
Produce Generalizations about Mechanisms
Across Countries
Had Laitin wanted to generalize about mechanisms rather
than outcomes based on Hegemony and Culture, what might
he have done? The first step would have been to conduct a
far more finely-grained analysis. A disaggregated version of
the analysis in the book as it stands is as follows:
ColonialismIndirect Rule “Religion expunged” from
commonsensical assumptions about politics in the colo-
nial period  Post-colonial Politicization of a Cleavage
The greatest level of disaggregation in the book is in the
analysis of colonialism. But it jumps over the many links that
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without its attendant controls, why is a micro-correlation ex-
portable without those controls?
The critique of outcome-based approaches, which em-
phasized that the effect of one independent variable is contin-
gent upon the presence of the control variables specified in
the model, applies to enterprises which are trying to test a
theory. If we interpreted the replication of each micro-correla-
tion in a new country as a “test” of the argument produced by
a previous within-country study, the same criticism would hold.
But rather than thinking of the presence of each micro-correla-
tion as a verification, we should think of it as a lever to identify
whether or not there are variables that matter in the new coun-
try that did not in the first. If a micro-correlation is replicated,
we should ask why, given the variables that characterize the
new country. And when the paths begin to diverge, we should
also ask why. Spotting repeated mechanisms in a new country
need not mean that the same variables are at work in each
country–the same mechanism might be produced by a differ-
ent variable. By forcing the researcher to identify variables
repeatedly in the course of building an explanation, a mecha-
nism-approach is designed to uncover the importance of other
variables–it may even be biased in favor of discovering addi-
tional variables.
(2) Why should we change our standards of evaluation
from outcome-based approaches to mechanism-based ap-
proaches? Isn’t a mechanism based approach simply an imper-
fect rendering of an outcome-based approach? If so, we should
continue to aim for generalizations about outcomes, since hold-
ing on to an ideal standard is important in inspiring research.
Our standards of evaluation determine the type of research
we do. One reason to switch from standards that value gener-
alizations about outcomes to standards that value generaliza-
tions about mechanisms is that this will lead us to look for
different things. Had Hegemony and Culture been written in a
field that valued mechanisms more or as much as outcomes,
my guess is that the level of analysis would have been far more
fine-grained than it was, and narrowed the field of inquiry for
other researchers more than it did. Changing our standards
may improve the quality of what we do in another way. Stan-
dards that value outcomes over mechanisms impose a direct
contradiction between the scientific nature of the findings,
which are contingent upon controls, and the demands of gen-
eralization in comparative political “science.” This contradic-
tion normalizes an implicit disbelief in the way that research is
done in comparative politics. Authors do not believe that they
are producing generalizations about outcomes that apply
across countries, but insert obligatory claims about such gen-
eralizations to be uncovered by “future research” in order to
prove their professional credentials. Readers do not often be-
lieve these claims but look for them anyway, as the obligatory
evidence of credentials by comparative political scientists. This
institutionalized disbelief has a corrosive impact on the quality
of research over the long run. Bringing our beliefs about what
we should do more in line with what we actually can do may
produce better quality research.
might conceivably tie colonial politics to post-colonial out
comes. A mechanism-oriented approach might have produced
an analysis that looks as follows:
Colonialism Indirect Rule“Religion expunged” from
commonsensical assumptions about politics in the colo-
nial periodAdditional Variable 1Additional Variable
2Additional Variable 3Additional Variable 4…......
……………..Post-colonial Politicization of a Cleavage
Generalizing from this study to a different country, then,
would mean checking to see whether particular links in the
chain of micro-correlations are replicated in another country –
and, since we can almost be sure that it will not, identifying
the point in the chain at which events in the other country
diverge.
The purpose of such a generalization is not to “test” the
hypothesis generated in the first country–a validation of that
sort, I argued above, was not possible. But it is to lead the
researcher to narrow the field of inquiry in the new country by
taking her towards a narrower and more sophisticated set of
questions.
Let me illustrate by showing how Hegemony and Cul-
ture, based on Nigeria, narrowed the field of inquiry for
Posner’s inquiry into ethnic politics in Zambia (Posner 2005).
Posner was interested in a similar question–what explains the
pattern of politicization of cleavages in post-colonial Zambia?
But Laitin’s book illuminated the place to start in looking for
an explanation. Rather than having to start from the begin-
ning and consider all possible hypotheses, Posner was able
to narrow his field of inquiry to the effects of colonialism. He
found that the first few links in the chain developed by Laitin
in Nigeria, which showed how colonial rule narrowed the set
of options open to elites in post-colonial politics, worked in
the same way in Zambia–and then he filled in the remaining
links from colonial to post-colonial politics through a new
model of institutional politics that highlighted the role of elec-
toral and party systems:
ColonialismIndirect Rule “Religion expunged” from
commonsensical assumptions about politics Party Sys-
tem Electoral System…………….........…Post-colonial
Politicization of a Cleavage
This analysis could of course be disaggregated still fur-
ther. But this illustrates, I think, the contribution of Laitin’s
study Hegemony and Culture, and the way in which it should
be evaluated. It is not a study that yields generalizations about
outcomes which validate the theory and elucidate universal
(or even regional) patterns. I cannot think of any within-coun-
try study in comparative politics that does that. But its contri-
bution lies in its identification of generalizations about mecha-
nisms, which narrow the field of inquiry for others and produce
more sophisticated point predictions.
Before going further, let me address two immediate ques-
tions:
(1) Why isn’t a mechanism-based approach subject to the
same criticisms about controls as an outcome-based approach?
If a macro-correlation cannot be exported to a new country
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IV. The Movement to Mechanism-Based
Approaches in Laitin’s work
I read the evolution of Laitin’s work since Hegemony and
Culture over the last twenty years as a movement away from
generalizing about outcomes to generalizing about mecha-
nisms (Laitin 1989, 1992, 1998). The central question in this
body of work is: what will the language outcome be in new
states? Should we expect the development of a single national
language? Laitin used a game theoretic representation of lan-
guage outcomes in Western Europe to narrow the field of
inquiry in India (Laitin 1989), the study of India to narrow the
field of inquiry in Africa (Laitin 1992), and the   studies of India
and Africa, among other countries, to narrow the field of in-
quiry the former Soviet Union (Laitin 1998). The particular
language outcomes in all these countries and regions were
different. But, as I discuss below, the chain of mechanisms
identified in each case helped to identify further mechanisms,
and explain the particular outcomes, in every subsequent case.
The study of Western Europe generated chain of mecha-
nisms that produced an outcome unique to Western Europe
(Laitin 1992, 35-36):
Rationalizing policies of the state Compliance by
regional elites Single language outcome
Starting with this initial path, Laitin identified a point of
divergence in India:
Rationalizing policies of the state Compliance by bu-
reaucratic elites Compliance by people (rather than re-
gional elites) Adoption of 3 ± 1 language outcome
The point of divergence in India from the path in Western
Europe was driven by the timing of language rationalization,
and the presence of different sets of actors. Language ratio-
nalization in Europe, which took place in a pre-democratic
framework, was a matter decided upon by regional elites and
those in control of the state. But the attempt at language
rationalization in India took place after the introduction of
democracy, and two other sets of actors were involved–bu-
reaucratic elites, and the people, rather than elites, of individ-
ual regions. Laitin was able to map the path in India not by
starting afresh, but by starting with the path identified in
Western Europe and then identifying this point of divergence.
The path in India then illuminated a more complex path in
African states, with several additional variables:
Rationalizing policies of the state Compliance by bu-
reaucratic elites Compliance by people Number and
distribution of languages Administrative Structure
Political Leadership Unique Language outcomes (One
language [Somalia], two languages [southern Africa], 3 ±
1 [possibly Nigeria] and so on)
As we see, the precise path varies from country to coun-
try. But it is not completely different–several mechanisms re-
cur across all pairs of countries, and there is at least one
mechanism that recurs in all countries, taken together. This re-
current mechanism is the “private subversion of a public
good.” Although individuals all cheer the adoption of a lan-
guage rationalization policy on paper, it is not individually
rational for them to switch to a single language themselves or
educate their own children in it. Consequently, through a se-
ries of individual decisions they subvert the policy in prac-
tice.
The result is a set of unique outcomes in each country,
illuminated, but not determined by, the path of the previous
countries studied. Indeed, Laitin notes: “The most important
general finding of the game-theoretic analysis is that the ‘play-
ers’ involved in state construction are different over the cen-
turies, leading to differently constituted language games and
of different equilibrium outcomes” (Laitin 1992, 119). This is a
very different type of analysis from Hegemony and Culture,
where the existence of different equilibrium outcomes across
countries would have been seen as a failure of the analysis
rather than its impost important finding.
In his most recent book Identity in Formation, Laitin
takes just one link in the chain of mechanisms identified in
previous work–the compliance of ordinary people with poli-
cies aimed at language rationalization–and disaggregates it
still further, going down to an individual level of analysis
which was missing from the first two books (Laitin 1998). This
study, perhaps to a greater degree than any of the others,
illustrates the extent to which adhering to the scientific stan-
dards of controlled comparison within a country makes it dif-
ficult to generalize about outcomes across countries. The book,
which compares different linguistic strategies of Russian-
speakers across the republics of Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia
and Ukraine, makes good use of the strategy of controlled
comparison to generate its findings–it focuses on the same
linguistic group with the same history in the same region, in
similar settings–and shows how variation in individual strat-
egies is explained by a difference in the expected payoffs of
compliance and the proportion of co-ethnics who comply
across the four countries. The same controls that make this
study scientific also make it difficult to generalize about out-
comes across countries. Indeed,  Laitin is careful not to make
predictions about language assimilation outside the former
Soviet Union. But what this study contributes to scholars
studying other countries is an individual-level mechanism
which may well recur across countries, and, when linked to
other chains of mechanisms, explain unique outcomes in those
countries.
V. Ethnography and Rational Choice are Two Overlapping
and Non-Exhaustive Ways to Identify Mechanisms
“Ethnography” and “Rational Choice” are not strictly com-
parable. Ethnography is the firsthand personal study of a small
group of people in a local cultural setting. As such it is simply
an approach to how data should be collected, without assump-
tions about the kind of behavior the data should reveal. Ratio-
nal choice, on the other hand, tells us how to model behavior,
or how to interpret data on behavior, rather than telling us how
to collect the data in the first place. The model of behavior re-
quires self-interested, goal-oriented actors who choose be-
tween a finite set of alternatives based on a calculation of the
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Figure 1: Rational Choice and Ethnography
costs and benefits.
To the extent that we can compare them anyway, there is
an overlap between the two. Ethnographic methods can be
used to probe the data for whatever relationships the researcher
is interested in–the relationship between an independent vari-
able and an outcome, or the sequence of mechanisms leading
from the independent variable to the outcome. Ethnography
might yield macro-correlations or mechanisms that are consis-
tent with a rational choice model as well as macro-correlations
or mechanisms that are not. Ethnography requires only that
the macro-correlations or mechanisms are inductively gener-
ated in a particular way–by studying people in their cultural
settings. A rational choice approach, on the other hand, is con-
cerned explicitly with mechanisms that assume or reveal self-
interested, calculated actions. These mechanisms may be de-
ductively or inductively identified. Indeed, although it is com-
mon to associate rational choice theory with purely deductive
thought, many of the most important rational choice arguments
in comparative politics are derived from, and embedded in,
particular empirical contexts–Down’s Economic Theory of De-
mocracy (1957), for instance, is informed especially by the
dynamics of the two-party democracy in the United States,
and Riker’s theory of federalism rests on the particular path of
American federalism (Riker 1964). The area of overlap between
the two approaches thus lies in the area of inductively devel-
oped mechanisms about rational action. This overlap is repre-
sented in Figure 1 above
Each approach has its comparative advantages, allowing
us to model certain types of mechanisms, at certain levels of
analysis better than others. The problem dictates the choice of
approaches or the combination of them. This is by now a stan-
dard pious statement in the methodological wars in compara-
tive politics, usually used to argue that there is no one right
way for how all research should be done. That’s true, but it
also means that for particular problems, there is one right way,
or a small set of right ways. Problems do dictate choices of
methods, and if we do not adopt certain methodological ap-
proaches, we cannot solve certain problems.
Let me illustrate again through Laitin’s work. In his first
book, Politics, Language and Thought (Laitin 1977), Laitin
argued that the choice of a single state language is not neu-
tral–it creates (or maintains) an elite, composed of those who
have access to education in the state language, and a subordi-
nate class (or classes) of those who do not. Once we accept
that the choice of official language puts some people in a posi-
tion of disadvantage and others in a position of disadvantage,
it is natural to ask how expectations about an outcome affect
the outcome itself by affecting the strategy of political actors
in the present. If English-speaking Somalis know that the choice
of Italian rather than English will affect their job prospects in
the future, then might this not affect the language that is actu-
ally adopted by informing their strategy in the present?
Rational choice approaches are the principal family of ap-
proaches which have been used to theorize about problems of
this nature. Thus, if a scholar wants to model the relationship
between expectations and outcomes, she must turn to rational
choice methods. She may very well discover other approaches
that are eventually superior, but this is the logical place to
start. Not surprisingly, then, Laitin has tried to integrate ratio-
nal choice into his study of language outcomes in every book
on this subject in every book on this subject since the publica-
tion of Politics, Language and Thought. He has used ethnog-
raphy, but also history, survey research and experimental meth-
ods to map the preference structures of individuals and collec-
tive actors–and then rational choice analysis to predict ac-
tions given this preference structure. Other research problems
may well suggest different approaches to identifying mecha-
nisms.
In recent work, Laitin proposes that this particular combi-
nation of approaches–formal theory, used mainly to mean ra-
tional choice theory, and narrative analysis, which I take to
mean mainly ethnography and historiography–should become
part of a standard, “tripartite” method in comparative politics,
along with statistical methods (Laitin 2003a, 2003b). Given the
context of the methodological debates in comparative politics,
this appears to be a broad approach, suggesting, as he has
demonstrated in his work, that both methods can be used in a
complementary way and one need not be chosen at the ex-
pense of another. But if we think outside that context, this is an
unreasonably narrow statement. Ethnography and rational
Ethnography          Rational Choice
Inductively identified Deductively identified
macro-correlations or mechanisms about
mechanisms about rational action
non-rational action
Inductively identified mechanisms
about rational action
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We might also, in generalizing from one within-country
study to another, move backwards from an outcome to a set of
independent variables. Consider the scenarios below. In each
scenario, the outcome is the same in Country A and Country B,
but the initial independent variable that produces the same
outcome is different. According to an outcome based approach,
there is little to choose between the three scenarios–all three
are bad.  But the three scenarios are not equivalent according
to a mechanism based approach. The first scenario shows a
higher quality generalization about mechanisms than the sec-
ond, since the chain of mechanisms replicated in longer. And
the second scenarios show a higher quality generalization than
the third, by the same logic.
Figure 3: Different independent variable, same
outcome across countries
Good
Country A 1          2
Country B                                       2
1a
Worse
Country A 1           2
Country B                                        2
1b
Worst
Country A 1               2
Country B 2
1c
In each case, what the mechanisms identified through the
study of one country can do in generalizing to other countries
is tell us where to look and what questions to ask–but not
whether the answer is correct. The test of whether each link in
the chain of mechanisms that explain an outcome in a new
country is the correct link should be a within-country test,
choice are not an exhaustive set of approaches which can be
used to identify mechanisms. Depending on what kinds of
questions the researcher is interested in, almost any technique
can be used. Those that are being used in political science so
far include survey research, experimental research in the labo-
ratory or in the field, agent-based modeling, among others–
and there are many other approaches that may be imported
from other disciplines, including neurobiology, psychology,
psychoanalysis, even literary analysis! Why restrict ourselves
to only these two?
VI. How Should We Evaluate the Quality
of a Mechanism-Based Approach?
The quality of a mechanism-based approach can be mea-
sured by the length of the chain of micro-correlations uncov-
ered in one country that is replicated in a new country or coun-
tries. The longer the chain of micro-correlations in the new
country that is illuminated by a previous study, the narrower
the field of inquiry becomes in that country, and the more
precise the remaining questions she needs to answer in order
to generate a point prediction for that country.
Consider the possibilities represented in Figure 2. In each
case, the study of Country A is an initial within-country study
which produces a chain of mechanisms linking variable 1 to
the outcome 2. We would like to generalize on the basis of this
study to Country B. Note that in all three scenarios, the same
independent variable produces different outcomes in Coun-
try A and Country B. But the three scenarios differ in the
extent to which the chain of mechanisms triggered by variable
1 in Country B runs parallel to the chain of mechanisms trig-
gered by variable 1 in Country A.
An outcome-based approach would judge all three sce-
narios to be of equally poor quality, since the same variable is
not associated with the same outcome across both countries
in any of the three scenarios. But a mechanism-based ap-
proach would judge them differently. In the first column, the
chain of mechanisms identified in Country A dramatically nar-
rows the scope of inquiry in Country B. In trying to explain
the same outcome in Country B, we find that we can start at
the same place as in Country A and follow along a great dis-
tance before the paths diverge. This is an example of a good
generalization. In the second column, the chain of mecha-
nisms identified in Country B takes us a smaller part of the
way towards explaining an outcome in country B. This is an
example of a worse generalization. And in the third column,
identifying the chain of mechanisms in Country A that pro-
duce the outcome in Country A tells us nothing about the
mechanisms that produce the outcome in Country B: the two
paths diverge at the outset. This is the worst of the three gen-
eralizations.
Figure 2: Same independent variable, different
outcomes across countries
Good
Country A 1        2
Country B 1
2a
Worse
Country A 1                                 2
Country B 1
2b
Worst
Country A 1          2
Country B 1
2c




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since only within-country tests can control for all the vari-
ables in that context. Continuing with the example of Laitin’s
work, if we want to test for whether the mechanism of the
private subversion of a public good identified in Somalia re-
curs in India, we cannot assume that finding the same mecha-
nism in both countries is evidence that it is at work in the same
way across countries. We would want to identify observable
implications of the argument about the working of the mecha-
nism and test these implications using variation across space
or time in India. It is through this painstaking series of ques-
tions and tests that we can get to unique point predictions for
individual countries. And if the study of a phenomenon in one
country shows scholars who study other countries which
questions to ask, and which tests to perform, in order to gen-
erate point predictions for those countries, then that should
count as progress in comparative politics regardless of whether
these studies, taken together, add up to some universal ex-
planatory framework.
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Is rational choice theory compatible with, and useful to,
ethnography, which I’ll take to be the interpretation of mean-
ingful action? For an affirmative answer, one might look to
Fearon and Laitin’s famous 1996 article on “ethnic peace.” Their
argument ran as follows: one way peace between two ethnic
groups can be preserved is if each group punishes its own
members for bad behavior toward the other group. Such “in-
group policing” is effective, they suggest, because people
usually have better intelligence about the doings of members
of their own ethnic group. Thus, members of an ethnic group
are in a position to reliably punish just those of their co-ethnics
who have behaved badly in inter-ethnic interactions. By con-
trast, to the extent that people have a hard time identifying
poorly behaved individuals who are not members of their eth-
nic group, they will only be capable of indiscriminate punish-
ment of all the transgressors’ co-ethnics. Such punishment
may also deter bad behavior, but is more likely to lead to a
spiral of violence. Fearon and Laitin capture these two possi-
bilities in the form of two distinct equilibrium strategies in a
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game involving both intra-ethnic
and inter-ethnic interactions.
To illustrate the real-world relevance of this argument,
Fearon and Laitin provocatively mobilize an anecdote from
the locus classicus of ethnography, Geertz’s essay on “Thick
Description.”
Geertz relates that in early colonial Morocco, a maraud-
ing band of Berbers attacked the home of a Jewish trader
in the Maghrib named Cohen. He survived but his guests
were killed and his goods stolen. Cohen could get no
help from the French authorities, but he belonged to a
mezrag, or trade-pact system, and he went to his insur-
ance broker, a tribal sheikh, to demand the assistance
due. The sheikh knew precisely who had Cohen’s mer-
chandise, accompanied him in a climb up the Atlas di-
rectly to the shepherd of the thief’s tribe, and took con-
trol of the entire herd. The tribal warriors soon returned,
saw what had transpired, and prepared to attack. But then
they saw Cohen and his insurance agent, a palaver be-
gan, and Cohen peacefully regained his goods at the pre-
cise insured value. [Cohen was given sheep meant to
correspond to “four or five times” his loss (Geertz 1973,
8).]  Note that ‘on the equilibrium path’ this institutional
innovation of tribal ‘information brokers’ would make mu-
tually beneficial trade relationships between Jews and
Berbers possible, despite problems of opportunism due
to a low density of social network relations. And, in the
case Geertz relates, the institution also prevented spiral-
